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Rant: Mandatory Life Imprisonment under Texas Recidivist Statute Not Vi

CASENOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Mandatory
Life Imprisonment Under Texas Recidivist Statute Not
Violative of Eighth Amendment When Applied to One
Convicted of Three Non-Violent, Property-Related Felonies

-

U.S.

-,

Rummel v. Estelle,
100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980).

At the punishment phase of William Rummel's trial for the felony theft
of obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses, the state prosecutor proved
Rummel had been convicted twice previously of felonies in Texas state
courts. His first conviction, for fraudulent use of a credit card with intent
to obtain $80 worth of goods or services, resulted in a three year prison
sentence. The second conviction, for passing a forged check in the amount
of $28.36, produced punishment assessed at four years' imprisonment.
Upon proof of these two prior felony convictions, the trial court imposed
a sentence of life imprisonment as mandated by the Texas habitual offender, or recidivist, statute then in effect.' This conviction was affirmed
on appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.2 Thereafter, Rummel's application for post-conviction relief in the Texas courts was denied
without a hearing.- A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case.' The panel determined the

1. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925) (repealed 1974) provided: "[w]hoever
shall have been three times convicted of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary." Id. The recidivist statute currently in effect
in Texas was enacted by the Texas Legislature in 1974 and slightly modified article 63. The
current statute provides:
If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that the defendant has previously
been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having
become final, on conviction he shall be punished by confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for life.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).

2. See Rummel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
3. See Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 587 F.2d 1193,
US
U...
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L. Ed. 2d
1200 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), aff'd,
382, 398 (1980).
4. See id. at 1200.
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life sentence imposed pursuant to article 63 of the Texas Penal Code' was
disproportionately excessive as applied to Rummel, and thereby violated
the eighth amendment.' On rehearing the court of appeals, sitting en
banc, vacated the panel's reversal and affirmed the district court's denial
of habeas corpus relief,7 relying heavily upon the fact Rummel would be
eligible for parole within twelve years of the commencement of his sentence.' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held
-Affirmed. Mandatory life imprisonment under Texas' recidivist statute
does not violate the eighth amendment when applied to one convicted of
three non-violent, property-related felonies.'
The power to promulgate penal schemes categorizing crimes and determining their punishments has traditionally been vested in state legislatures. 10 Principles of federalism generally prohibit judicial interference

with this power," but deference to legislative discretion must yield when
constitutional strictures are violated.12 One such limitation is the eighth
amendment prohibition against assessments of cruel and unusual punish-

ments.18 Originally construed to preclude unnecessarily cruel modes of

5. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN.

art. 63 (Vernon 1925) (repealed 1974).

6. See Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1200 (5th Cir. 1978).
7. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 662 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The court remanded the portion of the case dealing with Rummel's claim he was denied effective assistance of counsel to the panel for further consideration. See id. at 662. The panel, in turn,
remanded the case to the district court, ordering a federal evidentiary hearing be held on
Rummel's sixth amendment claim. See Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1979).
On remand, the court found Rummel's ineffective assistance of counsel claim valid and
granted a writ of habeas corpus, requiring the state to conduct a new trial. See Rummel v.
Estelle, No. SA-76-CA-20 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 1980) (order granting application for writ of
habeas corpus).
8. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 657-59 (5th Cir. 1978). Six members of the
panel dissented, however, stressing that Rummel had no enforceable right to parole. See id.
at 665, 671 (Clark, J., dissenting).
9. Rummel v. Estelle, U.S ....
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 398
(1980).
10. See Knapp. v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 168 (1952); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 14 (1852).
11. See Gregg. v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386,
393 (1958).
12. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 416-17 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., opinion).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment provides: "[excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. This language was taken verbatim from the Enlgish Bill of Rights of 1689, inserted in the Virginia Constitution in 1776, and became the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution in 1791. See Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment:
An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 839 (1972).
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.punishments,' the more recent application of the eighth amendment has
been to prevent cruelly excessive punishments." Although the concept
that the eighth amendment could forbid disproportionate sentences did
not appear in American case law until 1892,"6 the principles underlying
proportionality in punishments are deeply rooted in Anglo-American
philosophy.17
The first successful eighth amendment attack based on disproportionality, or relative excessiveness of a punishment, was the 1910 case of
Weems v. United States.'8 In Weems, the United States Supreme Court
struck down a Phillipine statute authorizing a minimum of twelve years
at hard labor, as well as permanent civil disabilities, for the crime of falsifying a public document.1 9 The Court found the prescribed punishment
14. See, e.g., Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (amendment protects
against cruelty inherent in methods of punishment); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890) (amendment prevents "inhuman and barbarous" treatment); Wilkirson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (amendment forbids tortures such as disemboweling while alive, beheading, burning alive).
15. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (amendment proscribes death
penalty for rape); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (amendment forbids
criminalization of drug addiction); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (amendment bars
expatriation for wartime desertion).
16. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). Justice
Field contended the "whole inhibition [of the eighth amendment] is .against that which is
excessive. . . " Id. at 340 (Field, J., dissenting).

17. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 844-46 (1969). This concept was derived from Judeo-Christian, Greek, and English thought. See id. at 844-45. The Law of Moses exacted an "eye for
an eye." See id. at 844. Though seemingly harsh, this concept of punishment was proportional in setting an upper limit on the penalty imposed. See id. at 844. Aristotle, in his
Ethics, cautioned that injustice was found when a disproportionate sentence either favored
or aggrieved an offender. See id. at 844. The Magna Carts assured a free man would be
fined only in accordance with the relative severity of any offense commited. See id. at 846.
The practice of graduating penal sanctions to the relative seriousness of crimes is premised
on the belief that such apportionment will entice one bent on criminal activity, through the
lure of reduced penalty, to commit the least socially harmful crime. See J. BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATURE 178 (1789), quoted in
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment:An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 852 (1972).

18. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
19. See id. at 366. This territorial statute imposed a minimum sentence of twelve years
cadena temporal on one who entered false information in a public record, regardless of
intent to defraud. See id. at 365-66. Weems was sentenced to fifteen years of this punishment, consisting of "hard and painful labor," while constantly enchained at ankle and wrist.
See id. at 366. He sacrificed marital, parental, and property rights while in custody and
would be accountable to the authorities for his whereabouts and activities for life. See id. at
366. The Court noted in dicta the eighth amendment was a progressive standard not to be
confined merely to prohibiting unnecessary pain, and that a sentence for a term of years
may be so disproportionate to an offense as to be cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at
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both inherently cruel and cruelly excessive in relation to the crime committed. 0 Conceding the powers of the legislature to be primary in defining crimes and their punishments," powers not to be intruded upon

lightly by judicial notions of the prudence of such legislation,2 2 the Court

went on to note the sole legislative limits are constitutional boundaries
which the judiciary must set.22 The case of Trop v. Dulles24 expanded the

meager body of eighth amendment law by determining expatriation for

wartime desertion was excessive 5 and finding further that the premise
underlying the amendment was "nothing less than the dignity of man. ' 26
The Court in the Trop decision acknowledged the state's power to punish," but found the eighth amendment acts as a guarantee that this
power will be circumscribed by the "evolving standards of decency that

mark the progress of a maturing society.128 Only with the relatively re-

368, 372, 374.
20. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910). The Court noted:
Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who have formed their conception
of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.
Id. at 366-67; accord, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[a] punishment out of all proportion to the offense may bring it within the ban
against 'cruel and unusual punishments' "); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("a cruelly disproportionate relation between what the law requires and the sanction for its disobedience may constitute. . . a cruel and unusual punishment"); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (the "inhibition [of the eighth amendment] is directed . . .against all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences [sic] charged").
21. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910).
22. See id. at 379.
23. Id. at 378; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454 (1971); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803); A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST,

No. 78, 576-77 (Hamilton ed. 1880), quoted in United States v.

Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1965). Criminal legislation is restricted by the Constitutional limitations that no ex post facto laws or Bills of Attainder be passed nor any enactment made
infringing the rights and privileges announced in the first, second, fifth, eighth, and thirteenth amendments. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-10, amends. I, II, V, VIII & XIII. See
generally M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 25-46 (1978).
24. 356 U.S. 86 (1957).
25. See id. at 101-03.
26. Id. at 100.
27. See id. at 100; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970).
28. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). The Court stated while the death
penalty was constitutional, it did not license the legislature to "devise any punishment short
of death within the limit of its imagination." See id. at 99. In Robinson v. California the
Court extended eighth amendment prohibitions to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). Finding the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid criminalization of drug addiction, the Court stressed the neces-
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cent decisions concerning the death penalty, however, has the Court atapply objective criteria to eighth amendment
tempted to identify and
9
proportionality claims.2
In modern jurisprudence, goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and isolation of criminals for the protection of society have largely replaced retribution as the dominant objectives of the criminal justice system." Faced
with a criminal who is resistant to reform, however, the penal focus shifts
away from efforts at rehabilitation as well as attempts to apportion penalties to crimes.3 The goal of the penal system then becomes deterring
these habitual criminals, or recidivists, from further criminal endeavors
by imposing increasingly severe sentences and ultimately isolating from
society those who will not be deterred.32 Although recidivist statutes apsity of apportioning punishment to the crime's severity. See id. at 667. A sanction
acceptable in one instance may be prohibitive in another, as "[e]ven one day in prison would
be cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Id. at 667.
29. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death penalty cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of rape); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (death
penalty not necessarily cruel and unusual punishment for crime of murder); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (death penalty may be cruel and
unusual punishment for the crime of murder if arbitrarily imposed). Justice Brennan suggested several criteria for assessing eighth amendment claims in his concurring opinion in
Furman. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 278, 281 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
These criteria were later adopted in Coker, when the Court stated a penalty is constitutionally excessive if it:
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence
is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering;
or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. . . . Furthermore,
these Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors
to the maximum possible extent. To this end, attention must be given to the public
attitudes concerning a particular sentence-history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be
consulted.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271, 274,
277, 279 (1972).
30. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 344 n.86 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from dismissal of
certiorari); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). See generally W. LA FAVE & A.
ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 21-25 (1972); Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited
Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 845 (1972).
31. See Morris, Introduction-The Habitual Criminal, 13 McGILL L.J. 534, 549-50
(1967). See generally Brown, The Treatment of the Recidivist in the United States, 23
CAN. B. REV. 640, 640 (1945); Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration,21 BuyPALO L. REV. 99, 101-02 (1971); Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 332, 349-50
(1965).
32. See Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1163 (1979). See generally Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21
BUFFALO L. REV. 99, 102-04 (1971). Originally recidivist statutes provided for gradual incre-
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pear in a variety of forms, they generally operate by imposing a set term
of imprisonment after a felon has been convicted of a specified number of
crimes designated by the statute to trigger its imposition. 3 Statutes of
several jurisdictions require the trial court to determine the appropriateness of invoking the statute.3 4 The more common practice, however, is for
the prosecutor to employ the statute at his discretion as a tool in plea
bargaining.3 Despite the sporadic application of these statutes, 6 and
their apparent inconsistency with the precept of apportioning punishments to crimes, 7 the recidivist statutes have consistently withstood con-

ments to sentences of repeat offenders in hopes of deterring them by the threat of longer
sentences. See id. at 101.
33. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 706-661 to -662 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (life sentence
discretionary with sentencing authority with conviction of third specified felony); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-2801 to -2806 (1975) (life sentence without parole mandatory on fourth
felony conviction when two convictions are for listed violent felonies); TEX..PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974) (life sentence mandatory upon third felony conviction). See
generally Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 99, 104
(1971); Note, Habitual Criminal Statute 12.42(d)-Open Door to Disproportionate
Sentences, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 629, 629 (1977); Note, Recidivist Laws Under The Eighth
Amendment-Rummel v. Estelle, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 606, 609-17 (1979).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 706-661 to -662 (1976 & Supp.
1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (Supp. 1979); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 161.725-.735 (1979). These jurisdictions require the court to consider the recidivist's past criminal record and predilection for future criminal activity in a special hearing before the recidivist statutes can be invoked. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 706-661 to -662 (1976 & Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1976); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 121-32-09 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.725-.735 (1979). These statutes
are comparable to the procedure proposed in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 7.03 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The Model Penal Code suggests a procedure by
which a court may sentence a person to an extended term upon his third felony conviction
only after a determination he is a persistent offender, a professional criminal, or a dangerous, mentally abnormal person whose prolonged incarceration is necessary for public protection or is a "multiple offender whose criminality was so extensive that a sentence of imprisonment for an extended term is warranted." Id. § 7.03(4). The extended term may not
exceed the authorized maximum penalties for each of his crimes if made to run consecutively. See id. § 7.03.
35. See Ferguson, The Law of Recidivism in Texas, 13 McGILL L.J. 663, 663 (1967);
Note, Recidivist Laws Under the Eighth Amendment-Rummel v. Estelle, 10 U. TOL. L.
REV. 606, 611 (1979). The common practice of prosecutors threatening invocation of recidivist statutes to induce guilty pleas was recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court
against a due process challenge. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
36. See People v. Anaya, 572 P.2d 153, 156 (Colo. 1977) (Carrigan, J., dissenting); Note,
The 'Bitch' Threatens But Seldom Bites, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 893, 912 (1975); Note, Recidivist Laws Under The Eighth Amendment-Rummel v. Estelle, U. TOL. L. REV. 606, 614
(1979).
.37. See Tx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02(3) (Vernon 1974) (one objective of Texas Penal
Code to prescribe penalties proportionate to seriousness of offense). Compare id. §§ 37.02,
12.21 (perjury punishable by imprisonment up to one year and/or fine up to $200) with id.
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stitutional attack."8
One notable exception to the constitutional impregnability of recidivist
statutes is the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Hart v.
0
Coiner."
The Hart court formulated a four-pronged test in an effort to
assess Hart's eighth amendment claim objectively.40 Hart had been convicted of three non-violent crimes4 ' and received a life sentence as man-

§§

19.03(a)(2), .03(b) & 12.31 (murder of victim by kidnapper punishable by imprisonment
for life or by death). But see id. § 12.43(d) (third felony conviction must be punished by
imprisonment for life).
38. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (due process claim:
threatening imposition of recidivist statute does not "chill" right to trial); Gryger v. Burke,
334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (ex post facto claim: statutes do not create a new offense); Graham
v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912) (double jeopardy claim: "repetition of criminal
conduct aggravates . . .[the offenders' immediate] guilt and justifies heavier penalties when
they are again convicted"). The Texas recidivist statute withstood an assortment of constitutional challenges in Spencer v. Texas. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967)
(Texas recidivist statute not violative of constitutional bans on double jeopardy, ex post
facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process, equal protection, nor privileges and
immunities). See generally Note, Recidivist Laws Under The Eighth Amendment-Rummel v. Estelle, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 606, 612-13 (1979); Note, Recidivism And
Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 597, 602-07 (1962).
Eighth amendment challenges to recidivist statutes have been repelled but have always
received only summary treatment by the United States Supreme Court in their dismissal.
See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631
(1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S.
673, 677 (1895). Constitutional affirmation has always been premised on the rational relationship presumed to exist between statutes and the legitimate state purposes of deterring
criminal activity and protecting society. See Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1937). But
see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). In
Hart the court stated:
[I]f a life sentence is good for the purpose [of deterrence], surely a death sentence
would be better. Putting Hart in prison for the remainder of his life for three offenses
that rank relatively low in the hierarchy of crimes would presumably prevent him
from passing bad checks but would not likely make of him a truthful man. Is it a
rational exercise of state police power to put a man away for life-at tremendous
expense to the state-because over a 20-year period he passed or transported three
bad checks and might do it again? Life imprisonment is the penultimate punishment.
Tradition, custom, and common sense reserve it for those violent persons who are
dangerous to others. It is not a practical solution to petty crime in America. Aside
from the proportionality principle, there aren't enough prisons in America to hold all
the Harts that afflict us.
Id. at 141. See generally Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO
L. REV. 99, 105, 112 (1971). Katkin suggests empirical evidence exists to show these statutes
affect only petty criminals from whom society may not need such drastic protection and
may not, therefore, effect the statutes' purported goals. See id. at 105-20.
39. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
40. See id. at 140-42.
41. See id. at 138. Hart had been convicted in 1949 of writing a $50 bad check, was
again convicted in 1955 for transporting $140 in forged checks across state lines, and finally
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dated by the West Virginia recidivist statute."2 In making the determination that a life sentence violated the eighth amendment as applied to
Hart, the court initially considered the nature of his offense in relation to
the relative severity of the punishment.4 3 Secondly, the court considered
the legislative purpose of the statute to determine whether a less harsh
punishment would adequately accomplish the legislature's intent.4 The
third aspect considered was a comparison of Hart's punishment with
those levied for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 45 The final prong of
the test was an examination of punishments meted out in the same jurisdiction for other crimes as compared with the punishment for Hart's
crime 6 The court proposed that an analysis based on these four factors,
was convicted in 1968 of committing perjury at his son's murder trial. See id. at 138. Had
Hart's first conviction been for writing a check for one cent less than $50 he would have
been guilty of a misdemeanor and liable for a sentence of only five to sixty days in the
county jail thereby precluding invocation of the recidivist statute. See id. at 138 n.1; W. VA.
CODE § 61-3-39 (1977) (current version at § 61-3-39 (Supp. 1980)) (forging less than $200 a
misdemeanor).
42. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977).
43. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974). The Hart court considered the fact that Hart's crimes did not involve violence or
threat of violence to person or property, and that the amount of the bad check was one
penny above misdemeanor classification. This aspect of the test, an examination of the nature of the offense, was derived from Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v.
Georgia. Id. at 140; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, in turn, took this criterion of comparing nature and gravity of offense to severity of penalty from the Weems decision. Id. at 325 (Marshall, J., concurring);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910).
44. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974). The Hart court found the legislative purpose to be deterrence and deemed life imprisonment excessive to deter one from writing bad checks. See id. at 141. This prong of the
test was drawn from Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia. Id. at 141;
see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). A punishment
is excessive if it "serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment."
See id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974). The court determined Hart's punishment to be a more severe punishment than he
would have received in all but three other states. See id. at 141-42; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2207
(1956) (repealed 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.190 (Baldwin 1963) (repealed 1975); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974). The Indiana and Kentucky statutes have since
been amended to discard the mandatory imposition of life ijpprisonment on the conviction
of a third felony. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.080 (Baldwin Supp. 1979). This interjurisdictional comparison aspect of the test was
suggested in Trop v. Dulles, although the Hart court did not acknowledge its derivation
therefrom. Compare Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1957) with Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
46. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 142 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974)./The court in Hart noted Hart would receive mandatory life imprisonment only for
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viewed cumulatively, provided a principled and objective test with which
to assess eighth amendment claims."
In Rummel v. Estelle,"8 a case factually similar to Hart,4 the United
States Supreme Court found no unconstitutional disproportionality in
Rummel's life sentence once he was determined to be a recidivist.5 0 While
conceding a sentence grossly disproportionate to the severity of a particular crime would be constitutionally barred, 5' Justice Rehnquist noted the
length of sentence imposed is wholly within the discretion of the legislature.52 This legislative discretion, the Court stated, was circumscribed
only by the bounds of the eighth amendment which could be objectively
discerned by the judiciary.5 3 The majority considered several criteria

the crimes of first-degree murder, rape, and kidnapping in his jurisdiction. The court did
not believe it rationally could be urged Hart's status as a recidivist check forger posed as
great a threat to society as did the previously enumerated violent crimes. See id. at 142.
This final prong of the test came from Weems v. United States, the landmark decision in
proportionality determination. See id. at 142; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381
(1910).
47. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974);
see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). The test that
emerged from the Hart decision comprised a cumulative consideration of 1) the nature of
the offense for which the challenged punishment is imposed, 2) the legislative purpose behind the choice of the particular punishment prescribed for the offense, 3) an examination
of punishments levied for the same crime in other jurisdictions, and 4) a comparison of
other penalties assessed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction. See Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136, 140-42 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
48. U.S. -. , 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980).
49. Compare id. at -,
100 S. Ct. at 1134-35, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 385-86 (defendant received life sentence under Texas recidivist statute for convictions of fraudulent use of credit
card in the amount of $80, passing a $28.36 forged check, and obtaining $120.75 under false
pretenses) with Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974) (defendant received life sentence under West Virginia recidivist statute for convictions of writing a check for $50 on insufficient funds, transporting $140 in forged checks
across state lines, and committing perjury at his son's murder trial).
50. See Rummel v. Estelle, U.S ....
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1134, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,
385 (1980).
51. Id. at
, 100 S. Ct. at 1138, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 389.
52. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1139, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 391. The Court stated the determinations of the relative seriousness of crimes and their respective punishments are necessarily subjective and the consequent line-drawing is properly within the province of the legislatures, not courts. Id. at -. , 100 S. Ct. at 1143 n.27, 1145, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 396 n.27, 397.
Citing Badders v. United States and Graham v. West Virginia as examples, the Rummel
Court noted the reluctance of the judiciary to review disproportionality challenges when the
focus is on length of sentence alone. Id. at -. , 100 S. Ct. at 1139-41, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 391-92;
see Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 393-94 (1916) (five years imprisonment and
$1000 in fines not disproportionately severe for seven counts of mail fraud); Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912) (life imprisonment under recidivist statute not unduly
harsh for three convictions of horse theft).
53. See Rummel v. Estelle, U.S. - .
, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1144, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,
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urged by Rummel to allow objective proportionality analysis,"' but
deemed them insufficient to avoid sentences representing "merely the
subjective views of individual Justices."" The Court concurred with the
court of appeals' premise that Rummel's parole chances were properly
considered in the proportionality analysis."1 While recognizing Rummel
had no entitlement to parole,' 7 the Court acknowledged the probability of
parole as a reality in the Texas penal system,"' and affirmed the lower
courts' denial of habeas corpus relief."
Justice Powell's dissent, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined,6" traced the development of proportionality in prior eighth
amendment analyses.6 1 This survey, the dissent maintained, did not support the majority's contention that the analytic criteria developed therein

397 (1980).
54. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1140-44, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 394-97. The Court found consideration of the nature of the offense not a proper judicial function. Categorizing Rummel's
crimes as felonies was wholly within legislative purview. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1144, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 397. Punishing Rummel as a recidivist with a life sentence was "nothing more than a
societal decision .... " Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1141, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 394. Comparison of
Rummel's sentence with one he might receive in other jurisdictions was considered to be
fraught with too many variables to provide an adequately objective criterion. Id. at -, 100
S. Ct. at 1141-42, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 394. Finally, comparing Rummel's punishment with punishments imposed for other crimes in Texas was dismissed by the Court as inherently speculative, since different crimes implicate other societal interests. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at
1143 n.27, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 396 n.27.
55. Id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 1140, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 391. The Court deemed objective
criteria developed in previous eighth amendment proportionality challenges to be of little
assistance in this case. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1138, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 390. The cases cited
by the Court in apparent approval of the concept of proportionality were all considered to
be distinguishable, involving punishments differing in kind rather than degree from the
more traditional punishment of imprisonment involved in Rummel. Compare id. at -, 100
S. Ct. at 1134, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 385 (imprisonment for life) with Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977) (death penalty) and Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 658 (1977) (corporal
punishment in schools) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 161 (1976) (death penalty) and
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (death penalty) and Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1958) (denationalization) and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 364 (1910)
(cadena temporal).
56. See Rummel v. Estelle, - U.S ..
..
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1142, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,
395 (1980).
57. See id. at -, 100 S.Ct. at 1142, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 395.
58. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1142, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 395.
59. See id. at __,100 S. Ct. at 1145, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 398. In a separate opinion, Justice
Stewart concurred in the Court's holding. He found the Texas recidivist scheme met minimal constitutional standards, despite being clearly inferior to more enlightened procedures
followed in many other jurisdictions. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1145, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 398
(Stewart, J., concurring).
60. See id. at .,100 S. Ct. at 1145, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 398 (Powell, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1146-49, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 400-03 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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were restricted to considerations of capital or inhumane punishments. 2
The dissent suggested a test could be formulated from the objective criteria that had evolved in prior cases."3 Taken into consideration by the dissent's test were the nature of the offense,64 sentences imposed in other
jurisdictions for the same crime,65 and sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other crimes. 6 Justice Powell pointed out a substantially
similar test had been used by the Fourth Circuit since 1973 to demonstrate the test could be applied without violating principles of judicial
restraint and federalism.6 7 Moreover, the dissent criticized the consideration of parole in the majority's proportionality analysis. 6s As Rummel had

62. See id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 1149, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 403 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
dissent stated the principles of proportionality were applicable to all sentences grossly excessive to the seriousness of the crime for which imposed. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1149,
63 L. Ed. 2d at 403 (Powell, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1150, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 404 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1150, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 404 (Powell, J., dissenting). In considering the nature of Rummel's offenses, the dissent noted: "[iut is difficult to imagine felonies
that pose less danger to the peace and good order of a civilized society than the three crimes
committed by the petitioner." Id. at -_, 100 S. Ct. at 1150, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 404 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1150-53, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 405-07 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
dissent noted an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions never adopted the Texas scheme
and of those that did, three-quarters have abandoned it. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 115051, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 405 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at -_, 100 S. Ct. at 1150, 1153, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 403, 407 (Powell, J., dissenting). In comparing Rummel's punishment to other punishments imposed in Texas, the severity of the recidivist life sentence was found to be comparable only to those found guilty
of crimes of violence against the person such as murder and kidnapping. Id. at -, 100 S.
Ct. at 1153, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 407-08 (Powell, J., dissenting). Compare TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974) (third felony conviction mandates life imprisonment) with id. §§
19.02, 12.32 (murder conviction may be punished by 99 years sentence) and id. §§ 20.04,
12.32 (aggravated kidnapping may result in 99 year year sentence). The dissent further
noted assessing life imprisonment for such crimes demonstrated a legislative scheme to proportion punishment to the relative seriousness of the offenses. The operation of the statute
without regard to the severity of the underlying offenses was found to be at odds with this
scheme. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1153, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 408 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1154-56, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 409-11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1149-50, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 403-04 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Court cited statistics to demonstrate the speculative nature of Rummel's parole
chances. The Governor of Texas had rejected 33% of all parole board recommendations for
early release during the six-month period between January and June, 1979 and, rejected
79% of the board's recommendations made in June, 1979. Austin American-Statesman, A1, col. 4 (Sept. 23, 1979), quoted in Rummel v. Estelle,

-

U.S.

- ...

100 S. Ct. 1133,

1150 n.l, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 404 n.ll (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). See Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 102 (1958) ("It is no answer to suggest that all the disasterous consequences of this
fate may not be brought to bear on. . . [the petitioner] . . . . The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.").
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no enforceable right to parole,69 the dissent maintained the punishment
must be considered as one for life imprisonment. 0 Applying its proposed
test to Rummel, the dissent found although Rummel's life sentence was
not inherently barbarous, it was grossly disproportionate to the severity
7 1
of his crimes, thereby violating the eighth amendment.
In conceding sentences imposed within statutory limitations are subject
to eighth amendment proportionality challenges,7 2 the Rummel Court implicitly acknowledged legislative discretion in determining punishment
for crimes is not absolute." This circumscription of legislative power by
the judiciary has been all but decimated by the Supreme Court's treatment of Rummel's eighth amendment claim. The Court's paramount
concern was that eighth amendment judgments be "informed by objective
5
factors to the maximum possible extent.""1
By justifying dismissal of
Rummel's proportionality challenge on grounds no suitably objective criteria were available for such a determination,7 6 however, the Court rejected the traditional standards of proportionality analysis which had
been employed by state and lower federal courts for years when assessing
disproportionality challenges to sentences imposed within statutory limits. 77 The Court repudiated, as insufficiently subjective, the factors pro-

69. See Rummel v.Estelle,__ U.S ....
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1149-50, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,
403-04 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1150, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 404 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at ._,100 S. Ct. at 1153, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 408 (Powell, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1138, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 389.
73. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). "Judicial enforcement of the . . . [eighth amendment] . . . cannot be evaded by invoking the
obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is
precisely the reason the . . . [eighth amendment] . . .appears in the Bill of Rights." Id. at
269 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) ("Courts must not
consider the wisdom of the statutes but neither can they sanction as being merely unwise
that which the Constitution forbids.").
74. See Rummel v. Estelle, U.S .. ...
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1156, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,
411 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. Id.at __, 100 S. Ct. at 1139, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 391. Both the Court and its dissenters
cite the admonition of the Court in Coker v. Georgia, that "Eighth Amendment judgments
should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of the individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent." Rummel v.
Estelle, U.S. -,
-,
100 S.Ct. 1133, 1139, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 391 (1980); id. at -,
100
S. Ct. at 1149, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 402-03 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977).
76. See Rummel v. Estelle, U.S ....
100 S.Ct. 1133, 1140-43, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,
391-97 (1980).
77. See id. at -,
100 S. Ct. at 1154-56, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 410-11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Enumeration of applications of Hart v. Coiner standards demonstrate objective criteria can
be and have been utilized by the judiciary with careful discretion. See, e.g., Hart v. Coiner,
483 F.2d 136, 140-43 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974) (used consideration of
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posed by the dissent, 78 thereby implicitly overruling the Hart test used by
the Fourth Circuit since 1973."' The entire Court had acknowledged the
validity of proportionality analysis in eighth amendment claims by the
0
time of its 1976 decision in Coker v. Georgia.8
The Rummel Court, there-

nature of offense, legislative purpose, comparison of punishment with that in other jurisdictions for same crime, and comparison of punishment for other crimes in same jurisdiction to
find life sentence imposed for recidivist convicted of three non-violent felonies excessive); In
re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 933-39, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 229-35 (1972) (applied consideration of
nature of offense, comparison of punishment with that in other jurisdictions for same crime,
and comparison of punishment for other crimes in same jurisdiction to find recidivist convicted of indecent exposure excessive); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378
(Ky. 1968) (employed consideration of nature of offense, proportionality of penalty to offense, and legislative purpose to find life imprisonment imposed on fourteen-year old for
rape excessive).
78. See Rummel v. Estelle, U.S ....
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1140-44, 1143 n.27, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 382, 391, 394-97, 396 n.27 (1980). Without making any direct reference to the Hart
opinion, the Rummel majority addressed and dismissed three prongs of the Hart test: consideration of the nature of the offense, comparison of the penalty to that assessed for the
same crime in other jurisdictions, and comparison of penalties imposed for other crimes in
the same jurisdiction. See id. at -,
100 S. Ct. at 1140-44, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 391-97. The Court
determined a consideration of the nature of an offense and its punishment to be merely a
"societal decision" effected through the legislature and inappropriate for judicial review. See
id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1140-41, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 391-92, 394. The Court deemed comparison
of a punishment to that imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions fraught with too
many variables to allow effective results. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1141-44, 63 L. Ed. 2d at
394-97. Finally, the majority found comparison of a penalty with that imposed for other
crimes in the same jurisdiction to be "inherently speculative" due to the differing societal
interests implicated. See id. at -,
100 S. Ct. at 1143 n.27, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 396 n.27.
79. See id. at -,
100 S. Ct. at 1140-43, 63 L. Ed. 2d 391-97; Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d
136, 140-42 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). As the objective criteria proposed by the dissent and rejected by the majority in Rummel was substantially the same as
that in Hart, the Court has presumably proscribed further federal review of state recidivist
claims in the Fourth Circuit's jurisdiction, as well as in Texas. Compare Rummel v. Estelle,
U.S. -,
-,
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 398 (1980) (considerations of
nature of offense, comparison of penalty imposed for same crime in other jurisdictions, and
comparison of penalties for different crimes in same jurisdiction are too subjective to be
used as criteria in judicial review of sentence imposed within statutory limits of recidivist
law) with Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140-43 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974)
(consideration of nature of offense, comparison of penalty imposed for same crime in other
jurisdictions, and comparison of penalties for other crimes in same jurisdiction are valid
objective criteria for use in judicial review of sentence imposed within statutory limits of
recidivist law).
80. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Justices Stevens and Stewart joined in the Court's opinion in
Coker which noted its subscription to the proportionality principle. See id. at 592. Justices
Brennan, White, and Marshall, in separate concurring opinions, embraced the concept as
applicable to eighth amendment claims in Furman v. Georgia. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 280 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 312 (White, J., concurring); id. at 33132 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Rehnquist, Burger, and Blackmun joined Justice Powell in his dissent in Furman acknowledging the appropriateness of the concept of propor-
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fore, attempted to justify its refusal to allow such analysis in the instant

case on the grounds that previously developed objective standards turned
on questions of punishments differing in nature from sentences for a term
of years.8 1 In so doing, the Court attempted to dismiss the objective standards developed in its prior decisions,82 maintaining those cases turned
on questions of punishments which differed in nature from sentences for
a term of years, and were therefore inapplicable."s Such a limitation on
proportionality analysis of eighth amendment claims is not warranted by
the language in those cases as the emphasis there is wholly on the relative
excessiveness of the challenged punishments rather than their unusual
nature.8 4
In noting Texas can justifiably deal more harshly with Rummel as a

tionality in eighth amendment assessments. See id. at 457-58 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81. See Rummel v. Estelle,

-

U.S ....

100 S. Ct. 1133, 1138-39, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,

389-90 (1980).
82. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (objective factors to determine public attitudes concerning particular sentence include history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and response of juries reflected in sentencing decisions); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) ("index of contemporary values" concerning challenged sanction can
be gleaned from legislative response and juries' reluctance to impose same); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (objective indicators of contemporary, moral consensus toward a punishment found in the appearance of the punishment in other jurisdictions, historic usage compared to current use, and acceptance by
society).
83. See Rummel v. Estelle,

-

U.S ....

100 S. Ct. 1133, 1138-39, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,

389-90 (1980). The Court suggested the findings of disproportionality of sentence to offense
in the "death penalty" cases and in Weems turned on the unique nature of the offenses
involved, making the standards developed in those cases inapposite to a determination of a
"traditional" sentence of imprisonment. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1138-39, 63 L. Ed. 2d at
389-91; cf Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death penalty); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 162 (1976) (death penalty); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (death
penalty).
84. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("Eighth Amendment bars not only
those punishments that are 'barbaric' but also those that are 'excessive' in relation to the
crime committed"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (penalty may not be "disproportionate to the crime involved"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) ("the final
principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be excessive"); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) ("[a] punishment out of all proportion to the
offense may bring it within the ban against 'cruel and unusual punishments' "); Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("a cruelly disproportionate
relation between what the law requires and the sanction for its disobedience may constitute
a violation of the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment"); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (it is a "precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense"); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (eighth amendment directed "against all punishments which by
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences [sic] charged").
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recidivist than were he a first-time offender, 5 the Court supports its rejection of Rummel's eighth amendment claim with cases dating from 1901
to 1916, all of which had dismissed the eighth amendment claims summarily."6 Noticeably absent from the list of cases cited by the Rummel Court
are the more recent eighth amendment cases in which objective criteria
were developed.87 The Court's reliance on old cases is inconsistent with
the proportionality concept that the scope of the eighth amendment is
not static, but must draw its meaning from the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."8 8
More in keeping with the proportionality requisite of delineating eighth
amendment strictures in light of "evolving standards" than the approach
taken by the Court in Rummel would be to assess contemporary values
concerning the challenged penalty as suggested in Gregg v. Georgia." One
method of accomplishing such an assessment is to consider the general
trend of recidivist statutes, as evidenced by the current status of recidivist statutes in other jurisdictions." It is initially significant to note only
85. See Rummel v. Estelle,

-

U.S ....

100 S. Ct. 1133, 1140-41, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,

392-94) (1980).
86. See id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1140-41, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 392-93; Badders v. United
States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916) ("there is no ground for declaring the punishment unconstitutional"); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912) ("[tlhis legislation [recidivist
statute] has uniformly been sustained in the State Courts"); McDonald v. Massachusetts,
180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901) ("[tjhe statute does not ... impose a cruel or unusual
punishment").
87. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1977) (objective factors to determine public attitudes concerning particular sentence include history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and response of juries reflected in sentencing decisions); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) ("index of contemporary values" concerning challenged sanction can
be gleaned from legislative response and juries' reluctance to impose same); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (objective indicators of contemporary, moral consensus toward a punishment found in the appearance of the punishment in other jurisdictions, historic usage compared to current use, and acceptance by
society).
88. Compare Rummel v.Estelle, __ U.S .
. 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1139-41, 63 L. Ed. 2d
382, 391-93 (1980) (Court analyzes eighth amendment claim using cases dating from 1901 to
1916) with (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-06 (1976) (Court uses cases dating from 1910
to 1976 to adjudge eighth amendment claim). The proportionality concept of "evolving standards" was developed in Trop v.Dulles and has been frequently utilized in eighth amendment determinations since that time. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); see Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976); cf. Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (eighth amendment to be interpreted in a "flexible and
dynamic manner"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth").
89. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
90. See e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594-95 (1977) (interjurisdictional comparison of penalties for rape); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (interjurisdictional
comparison of penalties for wartime desertion); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141-42 (1973)
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twelve jurisdictions in the United States have ever enacted a recidivist
statute mandating life imprisonment upon the conviction of three undifferentiated felonies.9 ' The trend away from this harsh scheme is evident,
as of these twelve, nine jurisdictions have since amended their statutes.2
Two of the jurisdictions have made the sentences lighter;9 one now requires sentencing discretion; 4 two relate the term assessed to the severity
of the triggering offense;9 6 two require a specified number of designated
violent crimes;9" and two jurisdictions have abandoned the concept of recidivist statutes altogether.9 7 Other jurisdictions enacting recidivist statutes require more than three felony convictions, or at least one violent
crime to trigger the imposition of their statute. 8 These statutes either
(interjurisdictional comparison of penalties for recidivism), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974).
91. See Rummel v. Estelle,

-

U.S ....

100 S. Ct. 1133, 1150-51, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,

407 (1980). The twelve jurisdictions which enacted such statutes include: 1) California, 1927
Acts, ch. 634, § 1, at 1066; 2) Indiana, 1907 Acts, ch. 82, § 1, at 109; 3) Kansas, 1927 Acts, ch.
191, § 1, at 247; 4) Kentucky, 1881 Acts, ch. 29, art. 1, § 12, at 318; 5) Massachusetts, 1817
Acts, ch. 176, §§ 5-6, at 447; 6) New York, 1796 Acts, ch. 30, at 669; 7) Ohio, 1885 Acts, H.R.
No. 751, § 2, at 236; 8) Oregon 1921 Acts, ch. 70, § 1, at 97; 9) Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974); 10) Virginia, 1848 Acts, § 26, at 752; 11) Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (1977); 12) West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977). See Rummel v. Estelle,

__

U.S ....

100 S. Ct. 1133, 1150-51, 1151 n.13, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382, 404,

405 n.13 (1980).
92. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (Deering Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8
(Burns 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 21-4504 (Supp.
1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25 (Michie/Law Co-op 1980); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
70.04, .06-.10 (McKinney Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.01, .11-.12 (Baldwin
1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725 (1979); VA. CODE § 53-296 (1978) (repealed by 1979 VA.
ACTS, ch. 411 (Supp. 1980)).
93. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (Deering Supp. 1980) (statute requires no more than
three additional years for each prior felony conviction); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Burns
1979) (thirty years additional sentence on conviction of third felony).
94. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Baldwin Supp. 1978).
95. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21.4504 (Supp. 1979) (up to three times maximum penalty
may be given upon conviction of third felony); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25 (Michie/
Law Co-op 1980) (third time offender gets maximum term for the felony for which he is
being sentenced).
96. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.04, .06-.10 (McKinney Supp. 1979) (mandatory life imprisonment on conviction of third violent felony); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725 (1979) (30 additional years if felony threatened life or safety of another).
97. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.01, .11-.12 (Baldwin 1979) (no mandatory habitual offender statute); VA. CODE § 53-296 (1978) (repealed by 1979 VA. ACTS, ch. 411 (Supp.
1980)) (no habitual offender statute for felonies).
98. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101(2) (Supp. 1979) (mandatory life sentence on
conviction of fourth felony); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4214-4215 (Supp. 1979) (mandatory
life sentence for one previously convicted twice of felonies when convicted of a third specified felony involving violence or threat of violence); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (Supp.
1979) (mandatory life sentence on conviction of third felony when at least one involves
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have a mandatory penalty of less than a life sentence,"9 or allow the sentencing authority some discretion in invoking the statute.100 The federal
recidivist statute' requires proof the felon is a "dangerous special offender," limits the maximum sentence to twenty-five years, and urges the
sentencing authority to proportion the sentence to the triggering offense.1 0 2 As indicated by the preceding survey, Rummel received a more
severe sentence in Texas than he would have in all but two other jurisdictions in the United States. 0 3 Though not dispositive of the question
whether Rummel's life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the eighth amendment,' 0' the above data provides a
clear and objective demonstration that the recidivist scheme utilized in
violence).
99. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (1975) (third-time felon receives sentence of ten
to sixty years or statutory sentence for third crime, whichever is greater); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
31-18-17 (Supp. 1979) (sentence of one found to be habitual criminal enhanced by an additional year on proof of a prior felony conviction, four additional years on proof of two prior
felony convictions, and eight additional years on proof of three or more prior felony convictions); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (West Supp. 1979) (one convicted of offense punishable by
term greater than ten years may be sentenced to additional ten years upon proof of prior
felony conviction within previous five years).
100. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.050 (1972) (life discretionary on conviction of fourth felony); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-104a (West Supp. 1978) (life discretionary after third felony);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 706-661 to -662 (1976) (life discretionary on conviction of third specified violent felony).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976).
102. See id.
If it appears by a preponderance of the information, including information submitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hearing and so much of the
presentence report as the court relies upon, that the defendant is a dangerous special
offender, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate
term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony.
Id. § 3575(b).
.103. Compare TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974) (life imprisonment
mandatory on third conviction of any felony) with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (1977)
(life sentence mandatory on third conviction of felony or crime implicating petit larcency or
fraud) and W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977) (life term mandatory on third conviction of unspecified felony). But see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140-42 (4th Cir. 1973) (disproportionality claims reviewed under West Virginia recidivist statute), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983
(1974); State v. Lee, 558 P.2d 236, 239-40, 240 n.4 (Wash. 1976) (en banc) (court will view
disproportionate sentences under Washington's recidivist statute).
104. Cf., e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(constitution "is made for people of fundamentally different views"); Howard v. Fleming,
191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903) ("[u]ndue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable
punishment in another case to a cruel one"); Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368,
401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (constitution "recognizes and preserves the autonomy and
independence of the States-independence in their legislative and independence in their
judicial departments").
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Texas is all but uniformly rejected in American justice systems.""5
Another indication of the current status of the "evolving standard" by
which eighth amendment claims are to be judged is demonstrated by the
recent action taken by the Texas Legislature. Texas has determined the
crime for which Rummel was most recently convicted does not warrant
punishment as a felony, 06 and has reduced the penalty for the crime to
misdemeanor classification.'0 An objective assessment of the nature of at
least the last of Rummel's offenses, therefore, could have been made by
the Court without any danger of unduly subjective speculation. 08
An interjurisdictional comparison of recidivist statutes' 9 and the recent expression by the Texas Legislature of its comprehension of the severity of Rummel's crime" 0 provide readily available objective indicia of
contemporary values. These accessible, but unemployed, gauges of current sentiment strongly undercut the Court's contention in Rummel that
no suitably objective criteria exist to assess proportionality challenges to
a sentence for a term of years.''
The Rummel decision signals a return to the approach taken by the
Court in its early proportionality analyses limiting eighth amendment determinations to considerations of barbarous and unusual punishments.""
This result is inferrable from the Court's insistence that objective criteria

105. See Rummel v. Estelle, U.S .....
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1150-53, 63 L. Ed. 2d
382, 405-07 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (theft of property valued from fifty to two hundred dollars is Class A misdemeanor) with id. art. 1421

(Vernon 1953) (repealed 1974) (theft of property valued fifty dollars or over a felony). As
Rummel's third conviction was for taking $120.75 under false pretences, today he would no
longer be subject to a life sentence in Texas. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1980); Rummel v. Estelle, U.S ....
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1135, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,
386 (1980).
107. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
108. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (crime of rape did not warrant
death penalty); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) (offense of falsifying pub-

lic document did not allow punishment of twelve years at hard labor); Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136, 140-41 (4th Cir. 1973) (recidivist's underlying crimes did not permit life imprisonment), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
109. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
110. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
111. See Rummel v. Estelle,
U .S __U
, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1143-44 n.27, 63 L. Ed.
2d 382, 396 n.27 (1980).
112. See, e.g., Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (amendment protects
against cruelty inherent in methods of punishment); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890) (amendment prevents "inhuman and barbarous" treatment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (amendment forbids tortures, such as, disemboweling while alive,
beheading, burning alive).
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be used in judicial review of eighth amendment claims,"' while dismissing as indefensibly subjective traditional modes of eighth amendment
analysis."" These irreconcilable commands necessarily limit future eighth
amendment challenges to punishments differing in kind, rather than degree, from traditional penal sanctions of fines and imprisonment when
clear, objective lines can be drawn.' 5 While it is not to be disputed principles of federalism and judicial restraint command the judiciary to give
great deference to the validity of statutes enacted under the states' police
power," the Rummel Court avoided its constitutional obligations 1 by
wholly demurring to the legislature's line-drawing in this case." 8
The Supreme Court's rejection of traditional standards with which to
estimate the fairness of sentences for a term of years indicates eighth
amendment challenges in the future will be restricted to those punishments differing in kind, rather than degree, from the traditional penal
sanctions of fine and imprisonment."' Legislatures now are given a free
rein to impose any penal sanctions within the limits of fine and imprisonment, as it is inferrable from the Rummel decision the Court will not
consider any proportionality claim when the punishment is for a term of
years imposed within statutory limits. By choosing to disregard the body
of eighth amendment law emphasizing the ban on excessively harsh punishments and entirely deferring to legislative discretion, the Court, as

113. See Rummel v. Estelle, U.S ....
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1139, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382,
390-91 (1980).
114. See id. at -'
100 S. Ct. at 1141-43, 1143 n.27, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 394-96, 396 n.27.
115. See id. at
,100 S. Ct. at 1143 n.27, 63 L. Ed. at 396 n.27. "Once the death
penalty and other punishments different in kind from fine or imprisonment have been put
to one side, there remains little in the way of objective standards for judging [disproportionate sentences]." Id. at -,
100 S. Ct. at 1143 n.27, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 396 n.27.
116. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 393 (1958); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
117. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). "Judicial enforcement of the [eighth amendment] ...
, cannot be evaded by the obvious truth
that legislatures have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is precisely the
reason the [amendment] appears in the Bill of Rights." Id. at 269; see Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 103 (1958) "Courts must not consider the wisdom of the statutes but neither can
they sanction as being merely unwise that which the Constitution forbids." Id. at 103.
118. See Rummel v. Estelle, U.S. -,
-,
100 S. Ct. 1133, 1139-40, 63 L. Ed. 2d
382, 391-92 (1980). "[Olne could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concedely classified and classifiable as felonies ...
, the length of
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative perogative." Id. at -,
100 S. Ct.
at 1139, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 391. But see id. at -,
100 S. Ct. at 1139 n.11, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 391
n.11.
119. See id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 1143 n.27, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 396 n.27.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

19

